By Yıldıran Acar, Political Scientist
Changes in international politics do not always begin with major agreements or historic declarations by world leaders. Sometimes a single statement is enough to challenge the assumptions behind a policy that had previously seemed unquestionable. Recent statements from Lithuania and Kazakhstan, in my view, are signs of such a period.
In Lithuania, discussions over the deployment of nuclear weapons have taken place against the backdrop of growing concerns about the Russian threat. At the same time, Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius, speaking after his meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, said that there was no intelligence indicating that Russia was preparing a military operation against Europe or NATO.
It is difficult to dismiss such a statement as an ordinary political comment.
Over the past several years, the perception of a Russian threat has become more than a matter of military planning for the Baltic states. It has influenced defense spending, NATO’s military presence in the region and public perceptions of security. The renewed debate over nuclear deterrence has also emerged within this broader context.
Now, however, the prime minister of one of the countries at the center of this security framework is saying that there is no concrete intelligence indicating that Russia is preparing an attack on Europe.
This inevitably raises questions about the assumptions behind some of the decisions taken in recent years.
Threat Perception as an Element of Hybrid Warfare
When I previously examined the debate in the Lithuanian parliament over the possible deployment of nuclear weapons, one point I emphasized was that threat perception itself can become an element of hybrid warfare.
Hybrid warfare is not limited to the use of military force. Cyberattacks, disinformation and information operations are only part of the picture. How societies perceive events and define the threats they face is equally important.
When a particular country is constantly portrayed as a threat, this can gradually influence political decisions. Higher defense spending expanded military infrastructure and tougher security measures can become increasingly acceptable to the public.
The Lithuanian case illustrates how such a process can develop. But there is now another important element: this security narrative is beginning to be questioned from within. The Lithuanian prime minister’s statement is therefore not simply about Russia. It also raises a broader question about the assumptions on which Europe’s security policies have been built.
A Message from Berlin
Around the same time, the statements made by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during his visit to Germany also attracted attention. At a joint press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin, Tokayev called for the conflict in Ukraine to be frozen first and for diplomatic negotiations to follow. But his assessment of Vladimir Putin was even more striking.
The Kazakh president described Putin as an important statesman and said that Russia’s current leader was an acceptable political actor for Central Asia, Europe and the wider world. And he said this not in Moscow, but in Berlin. That detail matters. Political language towards Russia in Europe has become considerably tougher in recent years. In the German capital, however, Tokayev spoke of the Russian president not as a figure who should be excluded from the international system, but as part of the political reality that must be taken into account.
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is consistent with this approach. Astana maintains its relations with Moscow while also developing economic and political ties with China and Europe. It seeks to preserve room for maneuver between different centers of power. In fact, this is increasingly what many countries are trying to do.
The World No Longer Fits the Old Frameworks
After the end of the Cold War, international politics developed for many years within a system shaped largely around Western political and economic institutions. Today, the picture is considerably more complex. China’s economic and political weight has grown. India is expanding its global influence. Russia is seeking to maintain its strategic position. Turkey, the Gulf states and Central Asian countries are developing relations with several centers of power at the same time.
These states obviously do not share the same political views or strategic interests. But there is a common tendency: they do not want to tie their foreign policy exclusively to a single center of power. Economic relations are accelerating this process as well. Energy, transport, technology, defense industries and critical resources are no longer simply economic issues. They increasingly influence foreign policy decisions directly.
This is why multipolarity is not simply a contest between Washington, Moscow and Beijing. It also reflects the emergence of an international environment in which more states have greater room to define their own interests and pursue their own policies. Tokayev’s statements in Berlin should be understood within this broader context.
The Limits of the Old Order
It is still too early to say that the old world order has ended. Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that it no longer works in quite the same way. International institutions, alliances and existing security mechanisms remain in place. At the same time, another process is underway.
States in different regions are increasingly putting their own interests at the centre of their foreign policies. They are trying to expand their economic and political space while navigating competition among major powers. As a result, the international system is becoming more complex and, at the same time, more multipolar. The developments in Lithuania reflect one side of this transformation.
On the one hand, nuclear deterrence is being discussed in response to the perceived Russian threat. On the other, the prime minister of the same country says there is no concrete intelligence indicating that Russia is preparing an attack.
In Berlin, meanwhile, the president of Kazakhstan, speaking at the heart of Europe, offers an assessment of Vladimir Putin that differs noticeably from the dominant political discourse and calls for diplomacy as a way out of the conflict in Ukraine. These two developments can certainly be viewed separately. But their timing is difficult to ignore. In both cases, assumptions that had long been treated as largely settled are being reconsidered.
On one side, the foundations of European security policy and the perception of the Russian threat are being questioned. On the other, there are calls not for a complete break with Russia, but for diplomacy and political dialogue. In my view, this is where we should look to understand the broader change taking place. The new world order has not yet taken shape. The old one has not disappeared either. But the distance between these two periods is becoming increasingly visible.
We are living through a period of transition. Major powers are reassessing their positions, while middle powers are seeking greater room for independent action. Their choices in the coming years may prove as important as the moves made by the world’s major powers.
The future balance will not be shaped only in Washington, Moscow, Beijing or Brussels. Astana, Ankara, New Delhi and other capitals are also contributing to the emerging balance as they pursue increasingly independent foreign policy choices. For this reason, what is happening today can no longer be explained solely through the prism of the confrontation between Russia and the West. The world is entering a more complex period. There are more centers of influence, relations between states are becoming more flexible, and national interests are coming increasingly to the forefront.
The new world order has not yet taken shape. But the old one is no longer sufficient to fully explain the changes taking place. This growing gap between the old and the emerging order is becoming one of the defining features of contemporary international politics.