By Mehmet Enes Beşer
New Zealand is no stranger to its aspirations for further engagement with Southeast Asia. Well-spoken speeches in Wellington, memoranda of foreign policy in ASEAN capitals, and more and more frequently, New Zealand finds itself ready to be a reliable Indo-Pacific partner with a steady interest in the future of Southeast Asia. Government policy at present: it promotes shared prosperity, regional stability, people-to-people interaction, climate change and digital cooperation. However, even though the vision is admirable, there is a basic question to answer. Is the above statement backed up by actual investments to legitimize the vision of the country?
There are several reasons why New Zealand would want to deepen engagement. To begin with, Southeast Asia is the most vibrant economic region of today, housing over 600 million people with a developing middle class. It serves as a junction of international trade routes and lies at the epicenter of the emerging multipolar world order. For a trade-oriented and relatively small nation, with increasingly ambitious aspirations in the Indo-Pacific region, establishing a variety of relationships beyond traditional partners is crucial. Moreover, they could serve as insurance for any future economic or geopolitical shocks.
Unfortunately, previous attempts at engaging with Southeast Asian nations did not produce the desired result. Despite years of diplomatic relations and the membership of New Zealand as an ASEAN dialogue partner since 1975, the engagement was inconsistent and under-resourced. There was a modest increase in trade and development assistance, yet the respective figures are not commensurate with the shares or exposure demonstrated by China, Australia, Japan or the European Union. As a result, in most ASEAN capitals, New Zealand is considered to be a nice but non-intimate player—rather than a respected influencer with a reputation for impact rather than moral values.
Nevertheless, the current administration is ready to change that image. The “Indo-Pacific Strategy” from 2023 and its supporting diplomatic statements contain new commitments to ASEAN centrality, regional peace-building, maritime security cooperation, and economic integration. People-to-people connections via education exchanges, labor migration projects, and other types of cultural diplomacy were singled out as a particular area to develop. New Zealand also signaled its readiness to contribute to regional initiatives in climate resilience, digital governance, and disaster response capacity.
However, intention to influence requires more than policy statements. Legitimacy for the evolving role of New Zealand will depend on the ability to invest diplomatically, economically and politically into Southeast Asia.
Investments in development assistance should receive due consideration in this respect. Despite the country having already established a tradition of aid distribution to the Pacific, any further expansion of the latter towards Southeast Asia will require not only declarations but also resources. Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are some of the countries facing numerous challenges to their development, hence the necessity of aid programs beyond episodic financial assistance. Climate adaptation, renewable energy sources, technological innovation, and gender programs would be highly beneficial for New Zealand to boost its international standing and promote these initiatives together with local organizations.
Trade and economic diplomacy could serve as another way to engage further with Southeast Asia. Regardless of the agreements on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the trade relations between New Zealand and ASEAN are relatively weak. SME partnerships, easing digital trade and green economy partnerships would ensure that New Zealand companies get access to the consumer and innovation market of Southeast Asia. This will require more proactive actions on the part of both governments and businesses.
Security cooperation is another component that is indispensable now. Even though the number of New Zealand troops in Southeast Asia is limited, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, and maritime capacity-building can be regarded as a strategic asset in case they are oriented to meet ASEAN priorities rather than broader geopolitical interests. New Zealand’s response is generally viewed as less securitized and more middle-power-like as compared to the great powers’ reaction, which is quite valuable in a region preoccupied with rivalry.
Most importantly, investments in language knowledge and representation are needed. The embassy presence in key countries of Southeast Asia is relatively insufficient, especially considering rotation at those posts hampers constant engagement and relationship-building. Training on languages, hiring regional experts, and conducting research on Southeast Asia will contribute to the development of mutual understanding. Expanding scholarship, labor mobility and diaspora outreach programs will also help foster people-to-people contact.
Conclusion
The pivot of New Zealand’s policy to Southeast Asia is a positive and strategically relevant step to take. Opportunities and challenges abound in this region; thus, the diplomatic strategy of New Zealand can serve as a much-needed counterbalance to regional power politics. Nonetheless, this trend should be legitimized and solidified by real political will and investments.
Rhetoric does not work in times when regional investments are high-profile and diplomacy is of top priority. Should New Zealand want to be regarded as a participant of international processes, rather than the benevolent bystander, it needs to act on its statements and invest in it. The expectation in Southeast Asia is not just friendship but long-term commitment and strategic partnership.