China’s AI Governance Agenda

Norm-Shaping or Norm-Setting

By Mehmet Enes Beşer

Artificial intelligence (AI) has evolved from a revolutionary technology into a crucial element of the global infrastructure. Today, the rules and regulations governing the development and use of AI, as well as the limits of its application, are critical for geopolitics. Among various states that seek to set the agenda for global AI governance, China occupies a unique position as a technology innovator and norm entrepreneur.

China as a Global AI Innovator and Norm Entrepreneur

China’s ambitions in the development of AI technology were declared back in 2017 when the State Council announced the plans to establish China as the world leader in AI by 2030. Over the past five years, the Chinese government has invested tens of billions of dollars in the research, development, education, and entrepreneurship in the field of AI technology. Moreover, AI technologies have been incorporated into the country’s digital governance systems, including its massive surveillance apparatus.

Nevertheless, it seems that China’s ambitions have recently moved beyond borders. Over the last few years, the People’s Republic has started advocating for a global AI governance system that aligns with its values and interests. First, China seeks to set norms in international discussions of the topic through multilateral organizations. For example, the country’s representatives in the United Nations, UNESCO, and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regularly propose principles that support the sovereignty of states, their right to develop technologies, and “technology neutrality”.

Second, China seeks to promote its vision of AI governance through bilateral agreements with other states. Currently, China has digital cooperation agreements with several Asian, African, and Latin American countries, which may incorporate clauses related to the development of skills and capabilities in the sphere of AI.

Third, China seeks to export its technologies and practices in the field of AI through its companies to developing countries that are interested in acquiring new AI capabilities. Many African, Latin American, and Asian countries lack adequate regulatory frameworks in the domain of AI, so they may benefit from collaboration with Chinese private companies that receive state support. Thus, China’s ambition in the field of AI governance is a multifaceted process involving both multilateral negotiations and bilateral and regional cooperation.

The Nature of China’s Efforts in Global AI Governance

According to critics, China’s efforts in global AI governance reflect the country’s ambition to spread its authoritarian values and technologies internationally. The critics believe that China seeks to impose its own model of digital governance based on the concepts of surveillance, centralization, and control. While these statements may be partially valid, China’s ambitions in global AI governance cannot be reduced to mere ideology export.

Instead, China seeks to create a sovereign, stable, and growth-oriented model of AI governance, which it believes is better suited for the contemporary world than the existing liberal democratic model of AI regulation. Furthermore, China’s vision may seem attractive for other developing countries, which lack advanced regulatory and technical capabilities and want to develop their digital economies independently of the United States and the European Union.

In other words, China may present a more pragmatic alternative to the dominant liberal model, which is perceived by some countries as too intrusive and ideological. The problem with China’s ambitions in the field of AI governance is that they might result in the fragmentation of the global digital space. While the race for technological dominance is still ongoing, China seems determined to set new AI governance norms.

For example, the rules and regulations regarding algorithmic biases, cross-border data transfers, autonomous weapons, and intellectual property in the digital space may remain fragmented. Thus, if China succeeds in setting its vision of AI governance, then it may lead to the formation of a fragmented digital space with different standards in different regions. Nevertheless, this does not mean that other states cannot counter China’s ambitions in the domain.

Conclusion

Although China’s ambitions in global AI governance represent a significant threat to the stability and inclusiveness of the digital space, they should be met with strategic engagement rather than isolation or confrontation. Instead of demonizing China’s actions and values in the field of AI, other states should negotiate with Beijing within multilateral platforms such as ITU and UNESCO.

At the same time, other states could collaborate with China in the development of international standards for the use and regulation of AI in global telecommunications and transportation systems. The private sector could also contribute to these processes through corporate collaborations and cross-border research projects.