By Orçun Göktürk, from Beijing / China
Taiwan is preparing for local elections to be held at the end of November. Of course, the ballot boxes will not simply determine mayors and local officials. The elections will also serve as a test of the political strength of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the opposition Kuomintang’s (KMT) capacity to recover, and the extent to which the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the island’s third-largest party, can alter the electoral balance.
When it comes to elections in Taiwan, the island is almost split in two, like a watermelon. I am referring to the political differences between northern and southern Taiwan.
While the KMT’s strongest areas are in the northern and central parts of the island, the DPP’s traditional electoral base stands out in the south. The TPP, meanwhile, is important particularly among voters seeking an alternative to the two major parties. Having made a significant breakthrough in the last general election, the TPP secured its position as the third-largest party in the legislature. At first glance, this picture may look like a geographical political divide. However, the dynamics behind Taiwan’s politics have historical, social, and ideological roots.
Chiang Kai-shek’s Land Reform and the Political Paradox of the South
One of the most interesting historical issues in Taiwanese politics is the land reform implemented by the KMT government in the 1950s. After losing the civil war against Mao Zedong despite American support and retreating to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek’s administration introduced policies in the postwar period that restricted the power of large landowners, improved conditions for tenant farmers, and enabled land ownership to be distributed among a broader segment of society. The “Land to the Tiller” program, implemented in particular in 1953, brought about a significant transformation in Taiwan’s rural social structure.
While these reforms produced successful economic and social outcomes, they also weakened the economic power of the existing landowning elites. Consequently, the KMT’s land reform was not merely a development policy. It should also be understood as a political intervention that transformed the island’s established centers of local power.
An interesting paradox emerges here. The reforms implemented by the KMT government were also part of a period in which the social conditions that could eventually strengthen its political rival began to take shape. Chiang Kai-shek carried out one of the most successful land reform programs in history by challenging the southern landowners and redistributing their land more equally. A major land reform was implemented within a relatively short period. As a result, southerners lost their wealth and developed a class-based opposition to the KMT. I would even say that many of them came to hate the KMT.
Meanwhile, the DPP emerged from the opposition movement of the 1980s, which increasingly emphasized the rhetoric of “democracy” and advocated the formation of a distinct “Taiwanese identity.” Over time, it became a party that placed greater emphasis on a political identity separate from China. It gradually established a traditional electoral base through its strong organization and local political networks in the south. Thus, the social structure transformed by the KMT through state intervention eventually became the foundation for a different form of political competition with the rise of the DPP.
The DPP’s Pro-American Line and the China Question
The most important aspect of the current elections for national politics is how Taiwan’s relations with China will evolve.
The DPP stands out for advocating Taiwan’s distinct political identity and its ability to act autonomously in relation to Beijing. The party’s security and political ties with Washington are an important part of this approach. The DPP’s anti-China policies and closer alignment with the United States turn the issue into an international geopolitical dispute that heightens tensions across the Taiwan Strait. For this reason, it is impossible to assess the DPP’s political line independently of the United States’ Asia-Pacific strategy.
The KMT, by contrast, emphasizes dialogue with China, economic engagement, and the reduction of tensions. A few months ago, the KMT leader travelled to mainland China and met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. He attracted particular attention with a speech on “Japanese imperialism” in Nanjing. The Taiwan People’s Party, too, pursues a pragmatic approach to relations with Beijing and promotes overcoming the polarization between the two major parties. However, the fact that the KMT and the TPP take a more moderate approach toward China does not mean that they share the same position on political unification with China. Both parties act according to their own political orientations and electoral constituencies. Their general position is more about preserving the status quo.
Therefore, the results of the local elections should not be interpreted as a direct referendum on China policy. Candidates’ personal qualities, municipal services, and local issues also influence voter behavior in local elections. Nevertheless, the results will provide an important indication of the parties’ political ambitions at the national level.
The Opposition’s Test: Will the KMT and TPP Be Able to Work Together?
One of the issues that could determine the outcome of the elections is cooperation between the KMT and the TPP.
The two parties have sought to field joint candidates in some constituencies in order to build a stronger alternative to the DPP. However, this cooperation has not been achieved across all electoral districts. Candidate selection processes, local political interests, and the organizational calculations of the two parties remain among the obstacles to coordinated action.
Developments in September 2026 concerning the breakdown of electoral cooperation in Hsinchu also exposed this problem. The opposition’s inability to field a joint candidate in one area could give the DPP an advantage in the race, even if its vote share declines.
In areas where the KMT and TPP cooperate, the consolidation of opposition voters behind a single candidate poses a serious challenge to the DPP. Conversely, in constituencies where the two parties run separate candidates, the division of votes will make the ruling party’s task easier.
Therefore, it will not be sufficient to assess the election results solely by looking at how many municipalities each party wins. The differences between constituencies where joint candidates are fielded and those where they are not must also be examined carefully.
Will the DPP Continue to Lose Support?
I spent more than 25 days in Taiwan in January and had the opportunity to speak with hundreds of people. I also met with officials from both the ruling DPP and the KMT in an effort to gauge the political mood on the island. Based on my assessment of the latest developments, my prediction is that the DPP will continue to lose ground politically in these elections and suffer a decline in its vote share in some areas.
The DPP’s main challenge is how far the political mobilization built around Taiwanese identity and opposition to China can outweigh its performance in local government. Even if voters continue to care about national security and identity debates, they also take into account economic problems, municipal services, and the performance of local administrations, all of which directly affect their daily lives. Furthermore, the rhetoric of Trump’s America, including its moves toward dismantling the transatlantic alliance and its hard-line attitude toward allies, is also raising questions among the people of Taiwan.
At this point, an important characteristic of Taiwanese politics becomes apparent: not all voters demonstrate an unchanging allegiance to a particular party. Of course, each party has its traditional and loyal supporters. However, undecided voters can change their preferences depending on candidates’ performance and the prevailing political circumstances. In Taiwan, it is quite plausible for someone who previously voted for the DPP to switch to the KMT or the TPP in the next election.
This flexibility creates an important mechanism of pressure on governing parties. Regardless of their political identity, voters can punish those in power when they are dissatisfied with local government. This means that no party can consider its traditional strongholds permanently guaranteed.
Could the Local Elections Foreshadow the General Election?
The significance of Taiwan’s local elections extends beyond the distribution of mayoral offices. A strong performance by the KMT and the TPP would call into question the DPP’s political legitimacy and its room for maneuver at the national level. Such an outcome could also trigger a new period of political reassessment concerning the DPP’s China policy and its relations with the United States.
Of course, it should be noted that success in local elections alone will not determine the outcome of the presidential election. As elsewhere, candidates’ personal popularity and regional issues can carry considerable weight in Taiwan’s local elections. In general elections, however, debates over foreign policy, security, the economy, and Taiwan’s future become far more decisive.
Nevertheless, the success of the KMT and the TPP in constituencies where they manage to cooperate would provide an important indication of whether the opposition can act jointly at the national level as well. Conversely, losses in areas where they fail to field joint candidates could demonstrate that the opposition’s fundamental challenge is not simply to reduce the DPP’s vote share, but to unite its own electorate around a common political objective.
In conclusion, the possibility that the DPP will lose votes while the KMT and the TPP gain ground in the upcoming elections should be taken seriously.